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The Depression of the 1930s continues to command attention; some 
urge wholesale revocation of the policy responses it engendered, while 
many predict its imminent return. An important trend in recent academic 
studies of the Depression is the broadening of the geographical range of 
countries analyzed, while adopting a more consciously comparative per- 
spective.’ This paper2 extends that work by analyzing selected experiences 
in Latin America, providing and commenting on comparisons with both 
Europe and North America. Its goal is to deepen our analytical under- 
standing of the factors determining changes in prices and output during 
the period. The basic framework of discussion is simple aggregate supply 
and demand curves, various aspects of which are investigated below in 
the different parts of the paper, leading finally to some broad conclusions, 
The interwar evolution of real output for six Latin American countries 
is presented in Graph 1; the post-1929 decline in output was greatest in 
Chile, least in Colombia, while Honduras did not experience a typical 
cycle during the early 1930~.~ The decline in GDP started before 1928 
*Address correspondence to Dr. Michael J. Twomey, Department of Economics, University 
of Michigan, Dearborn, Mich. 48128. 
’ Examples are Van der Wee (1972), Kindleberger (1973) Brunner (1980), and Latham 
(1981). 
’ An earlier version (Twomey 1982a) was presented to a symposium on “The Effects 
of the 1929 Depression in Latin America” at the International Congress of Americanists 
in Manchester, England. The author is indebted to the other participants, as well as Albert 
Berry and David Feeny, for their helpful comments. Many of the individual country studies 
from that symposium will appear in a book to be edited by Rosemary Thorp. To a considerable 
degree, the present paper is a response to Carlos Diaz Alejandro’s many insights about 
the period as presented, for example, in his 1981 working paper. 
’ Some comments are needed on the reliability of this data. Aggregate GDP estimates 
were not made anywhere during the early 1930s and the present-day quality of those 
estimates for the Latin American countries probably varies considerably. The Argentine 
and Colombian data resulted from CEPAL efforts in the early 195Os, and would arguably 
reflect the better statistics of those two countries, while not benefiting from the general 
learning experience of national income accounting that should be reflected, for example, 
in the chronologically later Mexican estimates. The Honduran data are something of an 
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19l; 1930 1940 1925 ’ 1940 
GRAPH 1. Index numbers of real GDP, 1929= 100. 
in Mexico (as it did in Australia and elsewhere).4 Various countries had 
significant overall growth during the period. Some basic statistics on 
macroeconomic variables are presented in Table 1, for a large number 
of countries. One aspect that stands out is the significantly poorer per- 
formance of the U.S., Canada, Austria, and Germany compared to either 
industrial or nonindustrial countries. In particular, the Latin American 
anomaly; coming from the Central Bank they have a certain authority, but it is not clear 
how extensive was the original data base. The Chilean estimates do not cover services, 
and in this sense they are the weakest presented. It is generally recognized that the 
Colombian price data do not fully represent nonagricultural items, which suggests an 
upward bias of the real values of government and other activities during the early 193Os, 
and thus an underestimate of the decline in output. 
4 An examination of sectorally disaggregated GDP totals would show that fluctuations 
were spread throughout the economies of each country, so that, for example, industry and 
agriculture closely paralleled total output. This observation does not deny that export 
demand had started to decline before 1929, nor will this paper enter into the question of 
the more fundamental causes worldwide of the Depression. 




Country Peak Trough 
Argentina 1929 1932 14 18 22 33 22 19 114 129 
Brazil 1929 1931 4 3 12 16 1 15 131 152 
Chile 1929 1932 27 15 i-4 24 +34 44 104 123 
Colombia 1929 1931 2 7 36 38 31 10 136 202 
Honduras * 1934 11 13 8 19 NA NA 86 112 

























































































22 42 28 20 100 106 
24 46 26 27 103 116 
17 28 20 10 117@ 116@ 
26 28 NA NA 104 1.52 
19 18 12 6 150 193 
15 12 4 9 164 252 
17 25 36 +17 86 106 
30 35 10 28 150 NA 
10 26 3 23 98@ W@ 
10 11 6 5 121 138 
16 23 3 21 136 146 
18 29 +6 34 86 78~3 
29 40 37 4 139 135 
11 9 12 +3 122 159 
12 24 19 4 100 105 
21 28 28 0 112 136@ 
22 23 13 11 113 114 
8 12 11 1 115 133 
5 13 +9 20 NA NA 
10 16 + 1 17 123 149@ 
12 11 0.5 10 118 128 
23 32 24 11 112 NA 
1937-1939 
Peak to Trough Index 
(Percentage Decline in) (Peak = 100) 
Q IO P Y M V Q I-O 
Notes. Q = Real Output; IO = Industrial Output; P = Price Level; Y = Nominal 
Income (or expenditure); M = Money Supply; V = Velocity. NA = not available. 
An asterisk indicates that the country did not experience a “normal” cycle; for those 
countries’ calculations, 1929 is taken as the base year, and the year of lowest nominal 
GNP as the trough year. A “ + ” indicates that that item rose, rather than fell, during the 
period. A “@” indicates average is for less than three years. 
Sources are discussed in the Appendix. 
u Solis (1970) reports real GDP about 0.1% higher in 1928 than 1929. As industrial 
production peaked in the latter year, and for ease of presentation, 1929 is used as the peak 
year in this and subsequent tables. 
’ This total, for manufacturing output, is from NAFINSA (1978, p. 156). The corresponding 
drop in all manufacturing (including processing of minerals and petroleum), is 31% (Solis 
1970, p* 91). 
’ Demand deposits only. 
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countries perform on average about as well as the European countries, 
with respect to either total output or industrial production.5 As has been 
suggested for the U.S.-European comparison by Gordon and Wilcox 
(1980), the different output experiences reflect both supply and demand 
factors. We turn first to the relatively less studied supply issues. 
THE SUPPLY CURVE 
For over a decade, contemporary macroeconomics has been refocusing 
attention on the behavior of aggregate s~pply.~ In their review of Temin 
(1976), Gandolfi and Lothian (1977) suggest that more attention should 
be given to this aspect of the Depression; it is hoped that a comparative 
analysis will be especially useful. 
Supply curves were econometrically estimated using the formulation 
P = flQ,P”IP,T), where P is the price leveL7 Q is real output, P” is the 
expected level of prices, and T is the time variable.* The time period 
covered is basically 1920-1939. The results of 2SLS estimates (using the 
Keynesian version of autonomous demand presented below) are presented 
in Table 2. Most of the coefficients have the expected signs, and the 
coefficients of determination are generally quite acceptable. The slopes 
5 The varied nature of the Latin American industrialization process is discussed by the 
contributors to the Thorp volume. Here, we might only note that, while Chu (1972 p. 52), 
in commenting on industrial development in Argentina and Colombia, is tempted to “interpret 
these changes as a shift from capital goods and intermediate products during the 1920’s 
to consumer goods during the 1930’s” (with textiles being a prime example), Fishlow (1972, 
pp. 332-335) sees essentially the opposite kind of movement in Brazil. 
6 Indeed, the rational expectations school attempts to discredit most standard Keynesian 
policy conclusion by its “supply side” insights. The reader will note that our supply 
analysis is in fact compatible with the rational expectations school, if the dramatic changes 
in exports, exchange rates, government expenditures, etc. are interpreted as having been 
unexpected, which seems a reasonable approximation. However, our analysis of aggregate 
demand ends up being almost textbook Keynesian. Some argue that the monetarist/Keynesian 
labels are obsolete; we should recognize, nevertheless, the broad analytical gaps dividing, 
for example, the contributors to the Brunner (1980) volume. 
’ The standard CEPAL (ECLA) analysis of the Depression involves changes in relative 
prices refocusing sources of growth from external to internal factors. International trade 
models traditionally handle relative prices assuming full employment, and, of course, a 
change in relative prices should not change the price level. This paper seeks to complement 
the CEPAL analysis by focusing on absolute prices and variations in output, enabling the 
Latin American experience to be placed in a broader perspective. 
’ The estimate for output, to be referred to as the slope of the supply curve, is the 
coefficient of most interest to us here, and should be positive. The estimated coefficient 
on time is expected to be negative, as capital accumulation and technological progress 
allow the same quantity of goods to be produced at a lower price. Following current 
analysis among macroeconomists, an increase in expected prices will shift the supply curve 
up, implying that that variable’s estimated coefficient should have a positive sign. P” is 
calculated by assuming that the previous year’s rate of inflation is expected to remain 
constant, i.e., P”, = P_ ,( 1 + dP_ JPm2). More sophisticated modeling of expectations for- 
mulations did not yield significantly different estimates, especially with respect to output. 






























7.11 0.25 1.22 -0.04 
2.95 0.22 0.30 0.01 
-31.4 0.77 3.72 -0.08 
11.1 0.62 1.17 0.03 
-0.73 -0.51 1.02 0.04 
3.15 0.65 0.76 0.02 
-40.8 0.18 4.95 -0.20 
19.6 0.46 2.13 0.09 
2.47 -0.02 0.31 0.008 
1.39 0.20 0.21 0.006 
-8.87 0.54 1.45 -0.03 
3.98 0.33 0.43 0.01 
2.10 0.23 0.58 -0.026 
0.42 0.13 0.10 0.002 
1.11 0.29 0.43 - 0.02 
0.48 0.17 0.05 0.001 
-1.56 0.39 1.77 -0.005 
0.60 0.31 0.34 0.001 
-1.69 -0.06 2.44 -0.09 
4.70 0.35 0.53 0.02 
4.18 0.04 0.29 -0.02 
0.52 0.17 0.20 0.004 
3.93 0.92 0.40 -0.057 
0.71 0.34 0.21 0.008 
3.31 -0.05 0.33 -0.006 
0.47 0.25 0.11 0.001 
4.42 0.40 0.05 -0.01 
7.67 0.37 0.93 0.02 
2.00 1.29 0.58 -0.03 
1.27 0.60 0.26 0.01 
-6.59 0.48 1.30 0.01 
20.58 0.23 0.32 0.007 
-2.51 0.70 0.72 -0.04 
3.08 0.42 0.26 0.01 
2.01 0.13 0.51 0.026 
2.37 0.19 0.74 0.25 
3.38 0.36 0.16 -0.02 
1.06 0.08 0.11 0.002 
-9.26 -0.11 1.77 -0.06 
5.47 0.55 0.67 0.01 
-7.93 0.38 2.81 -0.06 
3.64 0.50 0.79 0.01 
-19.7 1.13 3.42 -0.11 
10.5 0.60 1.45 0.03 
7.55 0.39 -0.28 - 0.004 
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TABLE 2-Continued 
Country Constant PVP output Time RZ 
Number 
Obs. 
Sweden -5.13 -0.42 1.25 -0.05 0.61 17 
3.77 0.40 0.46 0.01 
United Kingdom -9.86 0.54 1.83 -0.05 0.74 20 
4.66 0.26 0.57 0.01 
Yugoslavia -4.58 0.57 1.53 -0.06 0.86 10 
2.88 0.57 0.47 0.02 
Notes. All variablesdxcept time-converted to logarithms. Standard errors listed below 
estimated coefficients. Data sources are discussed in the appendix; the price index is usually 
CPI and the output is usually GDP. Equations are estimated 2SLS, for which the excluded 
exogenous variables (i.e., the determinants of the demand curve) are nominal government 
expenditures, exports, and, where available, investments. 
* Values of P” and P were assumed to be equal for Chile in 1928 and 1929. 
of the supply curves in the U.S. and Canada are in the lowest third of 
the 26 countries considered. In particular, the curves for the Latin American 
countries have relatively high slopes.’ 
Part of the explanation for the marked differences in supply responses 
would be that primary production is more price inelastic than industrial 
activities, as farmers have few alternative income sources, while indus- 
trialists may cut back on output in the short run. In fact, the estimated 
output coefficients of our supply curves are negatively correlated both 
to 1929 per capita income levels and percentage of income generated by 
industry.” Another factor often considered a crucial determinant of the 
responsiveness of aggregate supply is wage flexibility, especially during 
the period in question. Our attempts at expanding the above supply 
specification for the European countries to include wage factors were 
not successful, and will not be reported here.” The limited data available 
suggest a marked decline in (urban and mining) real wages in Chile, and 
’ Note that a steep slope implies a low elasticity of supply with respect to prices. This 
recalls what the structuralists were saying two or three decades ago. The monetarist position 
is also reflected by specifying supply as a function of expected prices; even “surprise” 
policy innovations will not have any long term effects on output. 
” Per capita income calculated from the sources listed in the Appendix, supplemented 
by Zimmerman (1962). For the Latin American countries, the per capita income levels 
were similar to those of a number of southern and eastern European countries, although 
the former were generally less industrialized than the latter. Note also that agricultural 
output in the U.S. did not fall as much as that of industry until the mid-thirties climatic 
problems hit. 
” Because time series on wages are scarcer, we do lose some countries, and shorten 
the time spans in others, Two plausible hypotheses were tested: a “kinked” supply curve, 
and one in which real or nominal wages also enter on the right hand side. 
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near stability in Argentina (and perhaps Peru, although not Colombia), 
in contrast to the non-Latin American countries in Table 1, where real 
wages (in manufacturing) increased. 
In summary, inelastic supply curves in Latin America, which have 
frustrated expansionary demand policies in the post-World War II era, 
tended to cushion output declines during the Depression. The steepness 
of the supply curves reflects the more traditional structure of production: 
what is not clear is the degree to which dedining real wages and/or other 
income redistribution factors may have accounted for this. These research 
issues continue to command contemporary as well as historical interest. 
THE DEMAND RELATIONS 
Two standard treatments of aggregate demand can be distinguished, 
one focusing on the quantity of money,12 the other emphasizing autonomous 
levels of expenditure. The monetarist theory explaining changes in nominal 
income (Y) by changes in the nominal money supply (A4) needs no in- 
troduction here. The alternative model will specify nominal demand as 
a function of the nominal values of investment (I), government expenditures 
(G), and exports (X). While equally acceptable from a theoretical point 
of view,13 this is not the traditional version. Many textbooks discuss 
changes in demand in real terms, effectively assuming constant prices, 
but such was not the case in the early 1930s in either industrial or 
nonindustrial countries, when both absolute and relative prices changed 
considerably.14 
‘* As a critique of Friedman and Schwartz’s classic Monetary History of the United 
States, Temin’s Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression seems mistakenly- 
or provocatively-mistitled, because the former work does not present such a unicausal 
analysis. When originally writing a History of the Economic Analysis of the Great Depression 
in America, Stoneman considered (in 1969) “the Friedman-Schwartz interpretation a very 
minor contribution to the lengthy literature on the Depression,” and relegated it to a small 
footnote. (1979, vi). The views of that author, as those of many others, have changed 
since then. 
I3 Exports generate demand not solely because of the quantity of goods sold, but, rather, 
due to what producers can buy with their income, which is determined by that quantity 
and some price whose determination is also important. Of course, it is easy to defend a 
model wherein government policy makers determine their nominal expenditures based, for 
example, on estimated nominal budget revenues. That may not be true of an individual 
industrialist making an investment decision, but an argument can be made that total national 
investment is determined in nominal terms by, say, tke nominal quantity of money or 
credit. This model has a direct parallel in the monetarist story of the nominal quantity af 
money determining nominal income. Note, however, that one study askmg some questions 
similar to ours, that of Pryor (1979), analyzed taxes, etc. in real terms. 
I4 Recent theoretical work on nontraded goods has emphasized that price and income 
effects in that sector often counteract those in the traded-goods sector, and that complete 
inclusion of price and output effects usually removes all effects of a devaluation except 
price increases, (in contrast to that lengthy part of international trade literature on the 
effects of devaluations which also concentrated on changes in output, exports, and imports, 
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TABLE 3 
Coefficients of Correlation of dY on dM and dG, dl, and dX 
R2 R’ R2 R2 
RZ using using R2 using using 
using dG, dZ only using dG, dl only 
Country dM anda!X dG, dX Country dM and dX dG, dX 
U.S. 0.84 0.89 Austria 0.00 0.81 
Canada 0.59 0.89 Bulgaria 0.72 0.17 
Czech’ia 0.20 0.12 
Australia 0.20 0.84 Denmark 0.13 0.88 
Japan 0.83 0.93 Finland 0.45 0.90 
France 0.04 0.76 
Argentina 0.39 0.84 Germany 0.55 0.99 
Brazil 0.17 0.69 Greece 0.00 0.54 
Chile 0.18 0.66 Hungary 0.38 0.78 
Colombia 0.61 0.78 Italy 0.26 0.83 
Honduras NA 0.93 Holland 0.30 0.75 
Mexico 0.07 0.78 Norway 0.13 0.97 
Spain 0.03 0.08 
Sweden 0.40 0.88 
U.K. 0.13 0.97 
Yugoslavia 0.45 0.64 
Notes. All variables in nominal values. NA = not available. 
Let us first compare the two demand models with simple regressions 
reflecting a pure monetary explanation and a straightforward “Keynesian” 
autonomous expenditure framework. The coefficients of correlation for 
two equations, one using dM, and the other dX, dl, and dG, to explain 
dY, reveal in Table 3 the latter to be uniformly superior to the formeral 
Although this result might be interpreted as evidence against the monetarists 
and in favor of the aggregate expenditures school, it is perhaps more 
useful to consider it merely as a justification for our procedure of analyzing 
the proximate causes of the decline in output in terms of the Keynesian 
variables.16 
still assuming, at least implicitly, a flat supply curve). Thus, the inflationary fear of devaluations 
on the part of policy makers in the 1930s finds theoretical support today in analyses of 
the long run, although there may be beneficial output effects for a short term. 
I5 This conclusion is robust for specifications in either levels or first differences, and is 
still true if the multipliers are constrained to equality. “d” is the first difference operator. 
l6 We will discuss below how abandonment of the gold standard severed the relation 
between income and the money supply. Another reason for this paper’s concentration on 
autonomous expenditures is the difficulty in modeling the transmission mechanism of 
monetary factors; interest rate data are difficult to find, and, moreover, it is not clear that 
the Keynesian separation of savings and investment decisions, which underlies the IS-LM 
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For many years, the standard Keynesian interpretation of the U.S. 
experience was that demand dropped because of a decline in investment, 
counteracted eventually by an increase in government expenditures. While 
not wishing even to attempt a summary of recent research for that country,r7 
it should be noted that for most of the other industrial countries the 
macro variable which fell the most was not investment but exports.” 
Apparently, the more general experience was that external factors were 
the most important cause of the decline of aggregate demand during the 
Depression in the industrial countries. 
Data on investments in Latin America are poor, and this type of com- 
parison is more difficult to make in the region. The estimates presented 
in Table 4 do not permit a general characterization; the decline of exports 
was larger than that of investments in Mexico and Honduras, and perhaps 
also Colombia, although probably not in Argentina. This observation 
must be qualified by considering the import content of investments. The 
CEPAL studies on Colombia and Argentina provide data suggesting mar- 
ginal propensities to import from total investments of 0.46 in Colombia, 
and 0.28 in Argentina. Other sources indicate about 0.20 for Australia 
and Canada. l9 This can be disaggregated; imports of machine-made goods 
had a marginal import content of 0.78 in Colombia, 0.68 in Argentina, 
and 0.39 in Canada; investment in construction goods rather uniformly 
had an import coefficient of 0.10. This is important, because construction 
typically accounted for over half of investment outlays.20 Adjusting the 
investment figures for their import content, it would seem that the decline 
of investment was probably somewhat less important than that of exports 
in the four Latin American countries for which we have data, and which, 
it should be noted, happen to reflect a broad variety of price and output 
experiences. 
For most of the countries considered worldwide, the government acte 
as an absorber of the demand shock. In fact, in about 40% of the countries, 
nominal government expenditures were greater in the trough year than 
they were in the peak year. The degree to which this countercyclical 
expenditure pattern was the direct result of conscious policy is still 
debated.” However, Table 4 also indicates that the magnitude of the fa’all 
framework, is valid for these third world countries, especially during the period under 
consideration. See Fitzgerald (1982) for further comments. 
” See Temin (1976), Brunner (1980), Trescott (1982), and Zevin (1982). 
I* Data presented for the countries in Table 1 in Twomey (1982a). In addition to the 
U.S., exceptions to this generalization are Canada, Germany, and Australia. 
I9 See Twomey (1982b) for details. 
*’ Data are presented in Twomey (1982a). 
” The classic statement on Brazil was Furtado (1963), the challenge to it is conveniently 
summarized in Pelaez (1979), and its essential validity is reaffirmed by, among others, 
Fishlow (1972). 
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TABLE 4 
Exogenous Variables in Latin America during the Depression (Q is Real Output Index 
(Peak Year’s Value = 100); Other Data in Nominal Values, in Millions of National 
Currency Units) 
Country Year Q GDP Investment Export Gov’t 
Argentina 1929 100 
1932 86 
1938 113 









1601 2167 988 
434 1288 850 
1024 1400 1278 
177 122 150 
57 80 114 
160 144 163 
Honduras 1929 100 185 15 75 15 
1932 98 155 6 57 12 
1938 88 162 12 40 12 
Mexico 1929 100 4244 150 590 276 
1932 84 2821 67 256 212 
1938 130 6818 302 710 504 
Sources. Argentina. CEPAL (1958b). GDP and investment were calculated using the 
output and price indexes of CEPAL together with official estimates of nominal GDP and 
investment in 1935, as reported in Diaz Alejandro (1970, pp. 398). This procedure avoids 
(most of) the large change in relative prices discussed in op cit., p. 29. 
Colombia. CEPAL (1957). GDP deflator in Cuadro 32 used to calculate nominal values 
of GDP. As indicated in Table 1, the reported decline in Colombian prices is greater than 
that of any other country. This series appears to give too high a weight to food products, 
and thus probably exaggerates the drop in nominal GDP and investments between 1929 
and 193 1. Nominal value of exports from League of Nations Statistical Year Book. Government 
totals include state and local governments. 
Honduras. All data from Tosco (1957). 
Mexico. Quantity index and nominal GDP from Solis (1970). Exports and government 
totals from Solis and Anuario Estadistico. Investment estimated from the data in Fitzgerald 
(1981, Table 5). 
in investment and exports was much too large to be absorbed by increased 
government expenditures, at least in Latin America.** 
A comparison of the relative sizes of the movements in autonomous 
variables23 is presented in Table 5. Supporting conventional interpretations 
of the period, Brazil generated the largest increments in fiscal deficits. 
Although Brazil and other countries eventually lowered them later in the 
22 Although the data are too cumbersome to be included here, it might be noted that 
the estimates provided in Twomey (1982a) suggest that the decline in foreign loans and 
direct investment was rather small compared to the overall reduction in domestic investment, 
a conclusion somewhat at odds with Fleisig (1975). 
23 We will look at differences with respect to 1929, for the statistical motive of avoiding 
differences in reporting procedures of government spending and receipts, especially with 
regard to utilities. 
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decade, Mexico raised hers.24 Budget deficits were allowed to increase 
in 1930 in most countries; subsequently, tax schedules were alteredZ5 in 
an attempt to compensate for declining tariff revenue. Contrary to what 
would be expansionary fiscal policy, taxes rose in two of our six countries, 
rather appreciably in Argentina. 
Many discussions of the Depression era describe dramatic measures 
taken by the various governments to reduce imports, in order to remedy the 
serious balance of payments problems. In fact, large improvements over 
the 1929 trade account surpluses had been achieved by Colombia in 1930, 
Brazil in 1931, Argentina and even Chile in 1932. See Graph 2. The 
change in the import function was certainly significant in all cases, an 
can be attributed to devaluations, tariffs, and lower external prices. The 
empirical separation of these effects would be quite difIicult.26 The changes 
in the trade surpluses were apparently larger in relative terms than the 
increases in the fiscal deficits.” Ecuador and Peru also engaged in budget 
balancing between 1929 and 1932, although its negative effect in Ecuador 
was counterbalanced by an increase in her trade surplus. 
Two related points may be mentioned. Firstly, the data on exports 
should ideally be modified to account for remission of profits. These 
amounted to 19% of export receipts in Colombia, 21% in Argentina, 48% 
in Honduras, perhaps 43% in Mexico (in 1926), while the “nonreturned 
value” of Chilean copper exports (40% of total 1929 exports) amounted 
24 Peiaez notes that between May 1931 and February 1933, 500 million milreis, or ap- 
proximately one third of the receipts of the National Coffee Council, were credits from 
the Banco do Brasil and the National Treasury. This would have been about 2% of annual 
national output. In contrast, the 1932 deficit of the State of Sao Paulo was about 100 
million milreis above what it had been in 1928. While recognizing the dominating influence 
of the evolving political situation of the Mexican revolution, Cardenas (1982) argues that 
the late 1930s deficit spending was the result of conscious countercyclical policy. Chile’s 
response to the disintegration of its export market was continued large deficit spending; 
in the absence of external finance, this created considerable intlationary pressures. One 
result is that our estimate of the real deficit declines, as prices (either wholesale or CPI) 
surpassed their 1929 level in 1932. It is curious that Fetter, writing in 1931, interpreted 
the political causes of pre-Depression inflation in Chile as the desire to reduce real debts 
held by landowners, while the typical defense of (potentially inflationary) Keynesian policies 
now is that it will increase employment of workers. 
” A detailed study of tax policy in Czechoslovakia is presented by Pryor (1979). 
26 The better performance of the Latin American countries compared to the U.S. extends 
Choudhuri and Kochin’s (1980) argument concerning the beneficial effect of exchange rate 
devaluations, although we are suggesting that other factors were also important. In particular, 
Jonung’s argument in Brunner (1980) would appear mistakenly to have credited monetary 
policy, as opposed to exchange rate policy and export mix, as factors determining the 
relatively better performance of the Swedish economy. 
*’ With the fiscal deficit and the trade surplus rising, one might ask why there was any 
decline in output, and the answer of course is the decline in investments. Data do not 
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+5, ARGENTINA 
DEFICIT COLOMBIA DEFICIT 
+5 BRAZIL DEFICIT 
HONDURAS 
DEFICIT 
MEXICO DEFICIT &><CIT ~ 
TRADE 
BALANCE 
192s ’ 1940 ’ 1925 1935 1940 
GRAPH 2. Government deficit and trade balance 19251939. Differences from 1929 levels 
as percentage of 1929 GDP. 
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to 70%.2* Of course, it is not clear how this profit outflow would be 
affected by the opposing factors of lowered prices on reduced post-1929 
volume, and higher exchange rates together with exchange controls? 
The existing balance of payments data are simply too weak to help here. 
Second, we might note the significant increase in many countries in the 
production of raw material inputs-especially cement and iron and steel- 
during the Depression decade. The impact of this process on income via 
the multiplier has not yet been investigated. 
FULL EMPLOYMENT DEFICITSAND 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
Recent studies have argued that the analysis of the effects of government 
spending should not utilize the actual budget, but rather the full employment 
budget deficit (or surplus). Different techniques of estimating the latter 
are presented in the literature; our own estimates3* are presented in Table 
6. Full employment taxes were estimated by regressing “real” taxes 
(i.e., nominal taxes divided by the price deflate?’ utilized in Table 1) 
on actual real output, and then substituting in the resulting equation an 
estimate of full employment output (obtained by projecting the average 
growth of output over ‘the two decade period onto the 1929 level). The 
table reports differences between each year and 1929 totals, as a fraction 
of trend real GDP, and suggests that the Latin American countries did 
not engage in as significant counter-cyclical policy as did Australia, the 
U.S., and the U.K.32 The results for Brazil and Colombia still indicate 
‘* Sources are CEPAL (1957, Cuadros 10 and 14) for Colombia; Banco Central Economic 
Review Second Series Vol. 1, (1957, p. 12) for Argentina; Cuadro 9 of Tosco (1957) for 
Honduras; Cuadro 1 of Olmedo (1942) for Mexico; and Mamalakis and Reynolds (1965, 
p. 378). Thorp and Bertram (1978) report for Peru individual company returned values of 
50% in copper, and only 10% in petroleum. 
” CEPAL (195’1, p. 279) estimates that the effective decline in Chile’s retnrned value 
oF exports was only half of the nominal decline. 
3” Brown’s (1956) study of the U.S. was updated by Peppers (1973), who estimated the 
full employment taxes on the basis of estimates of wages, salaries, and profits corresponding 
to potential GNP, while also accounting for nondiscretionary government expenditures 
(e.g., unemployment benefits). Middleton’s (1981) analysis of the U.K. involved significant 
recalculation of the actual budget-to eliminate “fiscal window-dressing”-and estimated 
constant employment expenditures and receipts. These latter result from disaggregating 
taxes and then using a calculated tax elasticity to adjust for the difference between actual 
and full employment income, all at nominal prices. Both authors refer the reader to 
unpublished appendices for details. The d&aggregation of taxes is appealing, but impractical 
for a comparative study, especially because the composition of full employment output 
(specitlcally, between traded and nontraded goods) would affect the estimates as much as 
the assumed levels of income. 
31 Exceptions are the U.S. and Canada, for which a deflator for government expenditures 
exists, and Colombia, for which CEPAL provides real government and tax totals. 
32 The reader is reminded that both Peppers (1973) and Middleton (19X1) support the 
revisionist interpretation downplaying the countercyclical role exercised by fiscal policy 
in the U.S. and the U.K. during the Depression. 
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TABLE 6 
Changes in Real Deficits Compared to 1929 Level, as Percentage of Trend GDP 

































2 0.5 -0.8 -0.7 io.2 -0.8 
0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -1.0 -0.2 -0.8 
3.6 0.7 3.8 -0.3 -0.9 -1.3 
0.9 -1.1 0.7 -1.8 -0.2 -1.8 
2.6 3.4 1.7 -2.1 -2.6 -2.5 
0.4 -2.9 -7.0 -7.8 -7.6 -6.2 
-0.2 0.5 1.2 1.9 0.5 -2.5 
0.8 1.1 1.7 1.6 -1.7 -3.3 
0.8 0.3 1.0 1.7 2.2 0.8 
-0.4 -0.7 -0.5 0.2 0.6 0.7 
2.6 1.8 -0.7 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 
1.2 2.6 2.2 2.5 2.5 1.9 
4.0 6.9 7.6 5.3 4.9 4.2 
1.8 -2.2 -1.7 0.2 1.2 1.3 
1.3 4.8 4.0 3.4 4.6 3.7 
0.8 2.4 1.5 1.0 2.2 2.5 
0.3 1.7 0.3 
-0.2 0.0 0.8 
1.0 2.0 2.4 
-0.7 -2.1 -2.6 









a FED = full employment deficit, i.e., expenditures minus taxes, estimated by the 
procedure described in the text. 
Source. Author’s calculations, as described in text, Peppers (1973, p. 302),and Middleton 
(1981, p. 280). Note that Middleton recalculated the actual budget, which may account 
for a significant part of the difference between his estimates and those presented here. 
countercyclical actions, although the latter’s positive response disappears 
if the less reliable departmental and local government expenditure totals 
are ignored, and attention is focused solely on the national government. 
Our estimates are undoubtedly very crude, as indicated by the com- 
parison in Table 6 of the two published studies, and open to considerable 
refinement.33 Rather than engage in such an exercise, some other comments 
33 There are three problems with our procedure. First, a very simple tax function is 
assumed. Second, there are problems with price deflators. Colombia’s data probably over- 
estimates the post-1929 fall in prices, and hence the subsequent rise in real government 
expenditures, while the opposite may be true, for example, in Chile. Third, this method 
reduces to comparing the growth in real government expenditures (as a percentage of total 
output) with the product of the marginal tax rate times the assumed growth of trend GDP. 
Estimates of the marginal tax rate resulted in the surprisingly large variation of from 0.045 
in Mexico to 0.365 in Australia. 
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are appropriate. We might note that there was a tendency for greater 
deficits in the more federated countries-Colombia, Brazil, Australia and 
the U.S. As noted above, the implicit attribution of meritorious intent 
to makers of countercyclical policy may well be erroneous, as increased 
government outlays often went to help people in the upper ends of the 
income scale, (such as coffee, beef, and wheat farmers in Brazil and 
Argentina), or resulted from armed conflict, such as the Chaco War, the 
border clashes between Peru and Colombia, and internal strife in Brazil, 
Central America, and elsewhere. Finally, the full employment budget 
may not be the most appropriate concept for comparing countries. Re- 
gardless of whom the increased government expenditures were supposed 
to help, the budget decisions were made in the context of falling prices 
and tax revenues, especially because of import and export taxes. Given 
the prevailing orthodoxy, a realistic counterfactual must consider the 
pressure for a balanced budget. This assertion is supported by regressing 
the growth of government expenditures (GOVERNMENT) on expected 
deficits (DEFICIT) and the difference between expected output and full 
employment output (GAP), all deflated by income, and approximating 
the latter two by their actual values lagged one year. For a pooled sample 
for all countries in Table 6 for those post-1929 years when output was 
less than its 1929 level, we obtain GOVERNMENT = -0.3ODEFICIT 
+ 0.03GAP -t DUMMIES; R2 = 0.41, with t coefficients of 3.72 and 
1.70, respectively. The coefficient on the DEFICIT is statistically significant 
at the 5% level, but obtaining positive coefficients on the dummy variables 
for Brazil, Colombia, the U.S., Canada, and Australia does not allow 
us to revise the negative judgment on countercyclical policy in countries 
like Chile s 
EXPORT PERFORMANCE 
The nominal domestic currency value of exports dropped after 1929 
in all Latin American countries. By the end of the period, the nominal 
value had exceeded that of 1929 in just half of our countries.34 We &all 
separate our analysis of export value into its two components, quantity 
and prices, as each has a separate story to tell. 
From the pre-Depression peak to the trough, the export quantum in 
Table 7 declined in all countries except Brazi13’ By the end of the period 
the export quantum was greater than the pre-Depression level in seven 
countries.36 It is noteworthy that in all of these countries oil and/or coffee 
34 Only in Honduras did the nominal value fall between 1932 and the end of the decade, 
because of the decline of exports due to disease. See Bulmer-Thomas (1982). 
35 For a more detailed discussion of price and quantity trends for these countries, see 
Twomey (1982a). 
36 Note the lack of correlation between growth of export quantum and growth of GDP. 
In three of the six countries for which the comparison is possible, the tww variables moved 
in different directions between 1929 and 1938. 
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TABLE 7 

















































Exchange Terms index of 
rate to of world 
U.S.$ CPI trade exports 
59 87 72 165 93 75 - 
65 62 103 130 92 112 97 
37 59 78 172 NA NA - 
72 80 92 1080 NA NA NA 
88 116 72 171 88 53 - 
145 158 87 230 131 45 123 
49 29 120 406 104 55 - 
150 89 161 300 168 51 82 
71 96 81 100 69 83 - 
133 132 101 177 112 60 131 
52 89* 59* 110 NA NA - 
77 114* 64* 143 NA NA 120 
56 80 76 112 63 82 - 
190 113 177 284 179 63 131 
37 77 60 124 NA 49 - 
74 103 71 124 NA 51 126 
42 SO* 56* 100 NA NA - 
65 91* 73* 100 NA NA NA 
74 82* 92* 100 91 NA - 
51 48* 103* 100 93 NA 103 
51 58 93 151 79 60 - 
142 50 192 218 119 132 110 
42 59* 61* 100 NA NA - 
55G ss* 42G* 490 NA NA 114 
95 84* 83* 115 NA NA - 
90G 67* 76G* 235 NA NA NA 
53 85 68 190 86 63 - 
102 105 97 180 98 66 119 






Domestic Exchange TeTllls index of 
currency Domestic rate to of world 







62 65* 81* 210 99 NA - 
103 81* 120* 178 98 NA 10.5 
81 85 96 127 84 89 - 
109 128 81 67 76 45 148 
“NA” signifies not available. 
The “Weighted index of world exports” was generated using the individual country 
weights of the separate products and world total exports, from International Yearbook of 
Agricultural Statistics, Lamartine Yates (1959)--giving data for 1937-and MetallgeselIschaft 
(1938). 
Sources. Value data is from League of Nations International Trade Statistics 1930, 1933, 
1938. Quantity and terms of trade series from Wilkie (19801, reporting CEPAL, data. An 
* indicates data are based on author’s calculations, using ITS data, including those products 
which accounted for more than 5% of trade value in 1929. This method yielded estimates 
very close to the CEPAL estimates for the other countries. Export price indices are author’s 
calculations. Exchange rates from Wilkie (1974). 
Consumer price indices (CPI) from series in tables above, and from Ecuador (1944). 
Venezuelan price index is WPI. For export values, a “G” indicates sources’s data apparently 
are values in terms of old gold prices. 
were important in pre-Depression trade, suggesting that it was the pe- 
culiarity of those products’ supply process which led to this result. Both 
have a lengthy and costly lead-in time, locking producers into long-run 
production strategies. Of course, a major difference between them was 
the changing world demand, with world output of petroleum growing 
some 40% during 1929-1938, more than that of any other major primary 
product. Although the general level of world trade during the 1930s was 
lower than that of the late 1920s there are other examples of products 
with an upwards volume trend, although none of them was so important 
as to change the direction of any other country’s overall export quantum. 
Note that pre-Depression diversity of exports was no guarantee of an 
ability to weather the storm of declining demand, as can be seen by 
contrasting Ecuador and Peru with Mexico and Paraguay. 
Domestic prices of exports are determined by two factors, the “world 
price” and the exchange rate. Over the period 1929-1938, few products 
improved relative to the overall price level in the U.S. or U.K. ; in a 
way, this is the well-known CEPAL declining terms of trade argument. 
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It should also be noted that the world prices of the majority of Latin 
American export products dropped between 1925 and 1929; virtually all 
of them more than the average price levels in the U.S. or U.K. 
Turning to exchange rates, we note in Table 7 that the general practice 
in Latin America was suspension of convertibility and/or devaluation 
sooner than the U.S., U.K., or Germany, and continued devaluations 
after those countries devalued during 1931-1933. The reduction of export 
earnings and the drying up of foreign loans before the crash on Wall 
Street caused great balance of payments pressure in Latin America, and, 
in spite of the growth of central banks in the region during this period, 
countries were not reluctant to break the gold standard rules by deval- 
uations. Colombia and three of the five Central American countries had 
not devalued by their trough year; Colombia waited until 1932 due to 
its having accumulated substantial amounts of gold during the 1920s 
because of foreign lending and the Panama settlement, while the other 
countries followed the U.S. dollar. 
It is interesting to note that five countries effectively let their exchange 
rate revalue between the trough and the end of the period. It is tempting 
to speculate that this was due to the strengthening of the world demand 
for those country’s exports-minerals and temperate climate food prod- 
ucts-in contrast to the other Latin American countries, which can be 
classified into two groups: producers of coffee and other beverages (cocoa 
and mate), which suffered from oversupply, or those Central American 
countries which pegged their currencies to the U.S. dollar. There are 
two exceptions to this generalization. Bolivia had suffered tremendous 
inflation because of the Chaco war.37 Mexico, on the other hand, provides 
a strong contrast with Peru, Uruguay, and Argentina, and one is led to 
search for the explanation of its short-term export difficulties in the 
structural transformations still occurring there as a result of the Revolution. 
This discussion of export performance has emphasized commodity 
specific characteristics rather than internal price changes. This reflects 
our observation that a country’s experience with exchange rate devaluations 
and domestic inflation generally had less impact on the volume of its 
exports than did the product mix of exports, or what Diaz Alejandro 
calls their “luck in the commodity lottery” (1981, p. 4). One attempt at 
quantifying this hypothesis is to use the values in Table 7 to correlate 
export quantum with either the “real price” of exports (unit domestic 
price divided by CPI) or the weighted index of world exports. The latter 
is calculated for 193711938 (and also presented in Table 7) for each 
country by summing by commodity the product of an index of world 
37 Bolivia’s need to devalue may also be due to her exports not having recovered as 
well as those of other countries, because her tin mines were more difficult to reopen after 
they had shut down. See CEPAL (1958a, pp. 30-31). 
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exports and the percentage of that country’s total exports (in 1929) ac- 
counted for by that commodity. The price variable is in fact strongly 
negatively correlated ( - 0.78) to the export quantum, in contrast to what 
one would expect in a supply curve relationship. The weighted world 
exports is positively correlated (0.66). We conclude that movements 
along the export supply curve caused by devaluations and other measures 
affecting internal prices were not as significant as shifts of supply curves 
due to cartel formation, together with price support programs for certain 
products under empire preference schemes. Generally, these other factors 
were commodity specific. 
MONETARY FACTORS 
The money supply does not perform well as the sole determinant of 
aggregate demand, as was pointed out above. The explanation for this 
is straightforward; as a result of the transference to Latin America of 
the economic and financial problems of North America and Europe, there 
was widespread suspension of gold shipments, defaulting on the foreign 
debt, and exchange rate devaluations. The abandonment of the gold 
standard tended to sever the link running from money (especially gold) 
to income.38 
To analyze this process, we have adopted the Friedman-Schwartz 
(1963) technique of focusing on the monetary base39 and comparing changes 
in it with changes in the money supply, for six Latin American countries. 
It is curious to note in Table 8 that the two countries which did not have 
a central bank in 1929, Brazil and Uruguay, had the highest ratios of 
gold to high powered money. In any event, there are three factors to be 
noticed in Table 8. First, the average ratio between high powered money 
and gold was much higher that the marginal ratio, so that, for example, 
a given percentage reduction in gold did not lead to a corresponding 
decrease in the monetary base or the total money supply. Second, there 
is a strong reduction in this “offset coefficient” after the imposition of 
exchange controls; this indicates the severance of the traditional link in 
38 Recall the frequency in Table 1 of large changes in velocity in the early 1930s. 
39 The monetary base, or high powered money, is calculated as the sum of currency in 
the hands of the public and the reserves of the commercial banks. This calculation, based 
on data from the League of Nations Commercial Bunks in 1931, 1934, 1936, and 1938. as 
well as various issues of the Statistical Year Book, is not able to include gold coin in the 
hands of the public, the extent of which is unknown at least to the author. The League 
of Nations presents statistics generated on a presumably uniform basis (the data on Chile 
does undergo revisions with regard to bank reserves); although it would be preferable to 
use national sources it is not clear that the various Memoriu of the Central Banks themselves 
present sufficiently detailed information. Our analysis was not possible for two countries: 
Mexico’s financial system underwent great changes during the early thirties for a number 
of reasons (see Cardenas, 1982), while none of the League of Nations sources provides 
any banking dam for Honduras. 
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TABLE 8 
Money Supply Process 
Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Peru Uruguay 
1929 Ratio of 
HPM & Gold 2.28 
Ml & HPM 1.64 
Ml & Gold 3.75 
Regression coefficients 
HPM & Gold 0.41 
Ml & HPM 2.33 
Ml & Gold 1.29 
Preexchange control period 
regression coefficient 
HPM & Gold 0.63 
Ml & HPM 1.50 
Exchange control period 
regression coefficient 
HPM & Gold 0.07 
Ml & HPM 2.75 
0.98 1.38 0.97 0.85 2.13 
1.77 1.77 1.47 1.83 0.96 
1.73 1.38 1.43 1.56 2.04 
0.06 0.64 0.30 0.36 0.98 
1.42 1.40 1.16 1.07 0.53 
0.11 1.18 0.47 0.79 0.54 
0.95 0.69 0.63 1.21 
1.02 1.49 1.43 0.55 
-0.31 0.49 0.16 0.05 
1.51 1.31 1.11 0.20 
Notes. Gold includes gold and foreign exchange. HPM is high powered money. 
Preexchange control period are the years before the imposition of exchange controls, 
as indicated in League of Nations Statistical Year Book 1941. Peru is not listed as having 
utilized official exchange controls. 
Sources. Data from League of Nations Commercial Banks, and Statistical Year Book, 
various years. Brazilian data from Neuhaus (1975). 
Regression coefficient reports the estimated coefficient of an equation using hrst differences 
of the two variables, with the second variable the independent variable. 
the price specie flow mechanism. Finally, although the marginal ratio of 
the money supply to high powered money is also smaller than the average 
in 1929, breaking down that regression into periods does not produce 
consistent results.@ 
Many central banks were created in the area during the interwar period. 
It is ironic that the two countries which provided technical assistance 
in that process, while serving as “role models”-the U.K. and the U.S.- 
were the ones whose abandonment of the gold standard in the early 1930s 
is often interpreted as being one of the most serious of the proximate 
4u Research on Canada and Australia has suggested that banks considerably altered their 
“excess reserves” depending on the perceived demand for justifiable and prudent loans; 
see Courchene (1969) and Schedvin (1970). The implication is that these demand factors 
had a significant impact on the quantity of money. Pursuit of this hypothesis would necessitate 
more complete data series, but some of this analysis is presented in detail for Brazil by 
Neuhaus (1975, pp. 114-125). 
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factors determing the world-wide depth of the Depression.4’ Most of the 
countries analyzed lost nearly all of their gold stocks, and few had 
replenished them (in even nominal terms) by 1936.42 That the money 
supply increased in spite of the drop of gold and foreign exchange reserves 
is attributable to deficit spending and greater leniency in terms of bank 
reserves, the clearest examples of which are Chile, Brazil, and Bolivia. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
A recurrent theme in many sections above has been the atypical ex- 
perience of the United States: flatter supply curve, larger drop in aggregate 
demand, stronger decline in investments compared to exports, and the 
uniqueness of the widespread bank failures. The strong implication is 
the inappropriateness of comparisons which use the U.S. as a standard. 
The overall Latin American experience appears not dissimilar from the 
broad spectrum provided by Europe. We have argued that Brazil is the 
only country in the region to engage in significant countercyclical fiscal 
policies, while noting that policies adopted to cushion the export decline 
had significant expansionary effects, a relationship which was probably 
not well appreciated at the time. 
An exploratory essay such as this inevitably raises many questions 
and points to areas in need of further research. For example, the monetary 
hi~stories of the region have not been written.43 In spite of the jockeying 
for influence represented, by the Kemmerer and Niemeyer missions, it 
would appear that the central banks each established did not differ much 
in design, and, moreover, that the pre-1929 existence of a central bank 
was not an important factor determining a country’s reaction to and 
performance during the Depression. With regard to export performance, 
one would ask why there was such a different response in the different 
primary products, the answer to which calls for investigation of storage 
policies, as well as why some cartels were more successful than others. 
Finally, our analysis of aggregate demand attempts to trace a middle 
path between the LDC perspective concentrating on the decline in exports; 
and the simpler version of Keynesian analyses oriented solely towards 
irrvestments. One wonders if during the 1920s some of the Latin American 
countries were evolving toward demand growth generated internally from 
investments, instead of exports, while maintaining essentially free trade. 
41 These financial aspects are thoroughly discussed by Kindleberger (f973), whose analysis 
focusing on the lack of financial leadership on the part of the U.S. and the U.K. expands 
ideas earlier formulated by Brown (1940). 
” FolloMng the practice of many governments of that time, the large effective devaluations 
of these currencies are not reflected in Table 8 in the gold totals by 1935; in most cases 
the eventual devaluation “profits” accrued to the government which used them to finance 
deficits. 
43 But see Triffin (1944). 
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This question gains relevance when we notice that some of these same 
countries are now moving towards dismantling the external control regimes 
which are an important legacy of the 1930s. 
APPENDIX 
Sources. For the following countries, the major sources for data: 
European countries, Mitchell (1975); Canada, Urquhardt and Buckley, 
(1965); USA, US Dept. of Commerce (1975); Japan, Okhawa and Shinohara 
(1978); Australia, Butlin (1962). Indian data from Singh (1965) and un- 
published output estimates of Heston. Turkish output data from Hale 
(1981, Tables 3.2,4.5); prices and money from League of Nations Statistical 
Year Book. 
Except where noted in the text, the Latin American data on real output, 
industrial production, and construction are from CEPAL (1978). The 
League of Nation’s yearbooks and United Nations (1949) provide the 
major source for wage, price, and monetary data. Additional sources are 
the following. For Argentina, money supply from Halperin (1968), wages 
from Di Tella and Zymelman (1973), trade and government totals from 
Chu (1972); for Brazil, monetary data from Neuhaus (1975), prices, trade 
and government from the Anuario Estatistico. Chile: wages from Estudistica 
Chilena, industrial and total output from Ballesteros and Davis (1963), 
using their cited CEPAL data after 1925, and their own index 1920-1925. 
This follows Mamalakis (1978), although it is interesting to note that 
CEPAL (1978) does not include their own pre-1940 estimates for Chile. 
Government totals supplemented with data from League of Nations (1938) 
and Chile (1933). Colombia: money, exports, and government from Chu 
(1972), wages from Urrutia and Arrubla (1970), CPI from Wilkie (1974), 
GDP deflator from CEPAL (1957). The Mexican price, output, construction, 
and money data are from Solis (1970), trade and government data from 
Anuario Estadistico. Honduras is taken from Tosco (1952) and (1957). 
Output estimates for Uruguay presented by Millot (1972) are not utilized 
here, less because of their reference to 1930 than because of the unexplained 
change in the ratio of services to total output between their estimates 
for 1930 and official data for 1935 and later years. 
For the Latin American countries, the nominal GDP estimate only 
exists for Mexico and Honduras; for the other countries these were 
generated by multiplying the price series and the CEPAL (1978) output 
series. This procedure was also followed for Czechoslovakia, France, 
and Yugoslavia. 
Price data were CPI except for the following: WPI for Germany, Greece, 
Austria, Italy, Spain, and Sweden; GDP deflator for Hungary and Mexico. 
Criteria for selection was goodness of fit in the supply equation, the 
author’s judgment on economy wide coverage of products, and, inevitably, 
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length of available time series. The monetary aggregate was Ml, except 
for Czechoslovakia, Sweden, and Spain, for which it was M2. 
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